challenging absent additional restrictions on the signal space and/or the utility function (Sims [2006] ). This paper does three things. First, we provide two new characterizations of the necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal choice in the Shannon model. Each presents simple inequality check either in the unconditional probabilities or in the posterior beliefs conditional on any choice. The latter has an interesting implication. We show that the ratio of the difference in utilities across chosen options to the log difference in posterior beliefs is constant across states and decision problems. This "invariant likelihood ratio" (ILR) property pins down the rate at which choice mistakes respond to changes in the cost of these mistakes. Second, we use these necessary and sufficient conditions to catalogue some of the behavioral consequences of the Shannon model, and, third, we show that three of these behaviors are sufficient to imply that information costs take the Shannon form.
The three behavioral properties build nicely upon each other, each establishing a different type of separability in the cost of information. The first property relates to changes in prior beliefs. We show that in the Shannon model posterior beliefs conditional on each choice are invariant to local changes in prior beliefs. We call this the "locally invariant posteriors" (LIP) property. We show that this property implies that the cost of information acquisition is additively separable across choices and in the prior. Intuitively, rational expectations implies that the sum of the posteriors weighted by the choice probabilities is equal to the prior. If LIP holds then changes in the prior feed mechanically into changes in the choice probabilities. The posteriors must be insulated from these changes. For this to be the case the cost of information must be additively separable in the prior and equal expected value of some function of the choice specific posteriors. This expected value is simply this function weighted by the probability of each choice. This weighting implies that the value function is linear in the choice probabilities given the choicespecific posteriors, which insulates the posteriors from the choice probabilities.
The next property relates to changes in prior beliefs that do not alter the probability of any payoff relevant event, but rather shift weight among states of the world which give the same payoffs to all choices. Behavior statecontingent choice is not affected by such changes in the Shannon model. We call this property the "irrelevance of irrelevant information" (III) property. III implies that the function of the posteriors implied by LIP must be additively separable across states. Intuitively, the posterior beliefs about one state must be insulated from changes in posterior beliefs regarding any other pair of states.
Finally, we show that if two choice problems are orthogonal in the sense that information that would be payoff relevant in one problem is not payoff relevant in the other, then in the Shannon model behavior does not depend on whether the agent solves both decision problems separately or simultaneously. There are constant returns to information acquisition in such situations. We call this property "independence of orthogonal decision problems" (IODP) property. When added to LIP and III, IODP implies that the costs of information take the Shannon form. IODP relates the cost of learning about the intersection of two events to the cost of learning about each event separately. We show that this leads naturally to Cauchy's functional equation, which itself implies Shannon (See Chakrabarti and Chakrabarty [2005] ).
These axioms allow us to interpret many popular information cost functions that nest the Shannon form. Llosa and Venkateswaran (2013) and Colombo, Femminis, and Pavan (2014) consider cost functions that are convex in precision. These generally satisfy LIP and III, but violate IODP unless the convex function takes the Shannon form. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2014) impose LIP, but do not require III or IODP. Woodford (2012) relaxes III.
Our paper is related to Matějka, and McKay (2014) who show that in the Shannon model state-dependent stochastic choice takes a state-contingent logit formulation. Matějka, and McKay derive the necessary conditions for an optimal policy. These conditions, however, are not sufficient. We extend their analysis by deriving the necessary and sufficient conditions. 1 Given that the problem is a concave optimization problem necessary and sufficient conditions are not themselves difficult to derive. What is nice is the simple form that these conditions take. These conditions involve a simple set of inequality constraints on the unconditional choice probabilities and do not involve the conditional choice probabilities. We also show how to write these conditions as a set of constraints on the posterior beliefs. The latter characterization is useful as we will relate our axioms will relate most naturally to the costs associated with various posterior beliefs.
Our axiomatization differs from standard axiomatizations of Shannon entropy following Khinchin (1957) . The domain of analysis is different. We are not interested in the properties of information revelation per se, but in the choice behavior that is implied by and defines the Shannon model. In this sense we are closer to de Oliveira (2014) who also constructs a choice theoretic axiomatization of the Shannon model. Our IODP axiom is closely related to his axiom of "separability in orthogonal decisions." Again the main difference is one of domain. de Oliveira axiomatizes preferences over lotteries over decision problems whereas we place axioms on the observable outcomes of choice. Our axioms also impose progressively stronger and stronger restrictions on the cost function, allowing us to relate them to work outside of the Shannon model. Section 2 presents the Shannon model. Section 3 catalogues some of the behavioral implications of the Shannon model. Section 4 argues that LIP, III, and IODP are sufficient to characterize the Shannon model. Section 5 relates our axiomatization to others in the literature. Section 6 discusses various attempts to generalize the Shannon model and how these relate to our axioms. Section 7 concludes. focus is on the discreteness of optimal choice out of continuous choice sets in environments with non-gaussian uncertainty.
The model
We consider a decision maker facing one of many possible choice problems. In each decision problem there is a set of relevant events which the decision maker would like to learn about to inform choice over a set of options. We wish to compare the outcomes of the different decision problems with different relevant events and to consider different correlations among the relevant events. We therefore consider payoffs that are simple functions on some underlying probability space.
The decision making environment
There is a set of possible states of the world Ω.  denotes a generic state of the world. We assume that Ω is finite. There is large but finite of A of potential options with state dependent payoffs    for  ∈ A and  ∈ Ω. A decision problem ( ) consists of a prior distribution  ∈ ∆(Ω) over these states of the world and a subset of options  ⊆ A from which the decision maker must choose. Given the decision problem ( ), the decision maker chooses the probability of option  ∈  in each state  to maximize the expected value of payoffs. Conditioning the choice on the state, requires costly information. This cost is represented by an entropy constraint.
We will restrict the payoffs   to be simple functions on Ω:
It will be useful below to define Ψ  as the partition Ω formed by the intersections of the sets {Ω   }  =1 for all  ∈ . For each  ∈ Ψ  , the payoffs to all choices are constant across states  ∈  and Ψ  is the coarsest partition with this property.
Matějka and McKay show that the problem ( ) can be written as follows:
The first term is the expected payoff to to the set of state contingent choice probabilities    . The second term is the entropy constraint.  is the marginal cost of information.
Necessary and sufficient conditions
Matějka and McKay show that the optimal policy must satisfy,
While the conditions (2) are necessary, they are not sufficient. For example, for any option ,    = 1 satisfies these conditions. This is not surprising since    = 1 is the optimal policy when only option  is available and the necessary conditions depend on the choice set only in the sense that all of the choices in the sum in the denominator must be available.
According to (2) it is sufficient to solve for the unconditional probabilities of the options,   , as the state contingent choice probabilities,    , are completely determined by these unconditional probabilities. To get sufficient conditions we focus on the choice of the  0 . We can reformulate the maximization problem in terms of which options are chosen. Substituting for    , the Lagrangian for this problem is:
and the associated first order condition is
We can simplify further by noting that
with equality if the option is chosen. (4) are the necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimum. We summarize this discussion in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1
The policy {  } ∈ is optimal if and only if:
Given the concavity of the problem (1) we know that the solution {   } ∈∈Ω to the decision problem ( ) is unique.
Irrelevance of Irrelevant Information
One implication of (2) is that the agent behaves as if the states are the events in Ψ  rather than states in Ω. Given  ∈ Ψ  , the payoffs to all options are constant:
Hence the    are constant for all states  ∈ . This allows us to recast the problem as one of choosing
An immediate consequence is that the agent does not value information regarding the various states  ∈  except in so far as they inform the agent about  itself. This is our first behavioral implication of the Shannon model: any shift in prior beliefs over states  ∈ Ω that does not alter the probability of any payoff relevant event  ∈ Ψ will not affect either the conditional choices {   } ∈∈Ω or the unconditional choices {  } ∈ . We call this property the "irrelevance of irrelevant information." Propostion 2 (Irrelevence of Irrelevent Information) Consider a choice problem ( ) and consider any  ∈ Ψ  . Let  1 and  2 be any nonempty sets such that  1 ∪  2 =  and  1 ∩  2 = ∅. Then for fixed   , the optimal policy {   } ∈∈Ω is independent of   1 and   2 .
For our other behavioral implications it is useful to write (4) in terms of the posteriors implied by each choice.
A posterior based approach
Note any set of conditional choices {   } ∈∈Ψ implies a set of unconditional choice probabilities {  } ∈ . For each    0, these choices also imply posterior belief   ∈ ∆(Ψ). By Bayes rule
We will formulate our behavioral characterization of the Shannon model in terms of the posteriors.
It follows immediately from (2) 
The necessary and sufficient conditions (4) become
when options  and  are chosen and
when option  is chosen and option . We therefore have the following alternative characterization of the optimal policy: 
Likelihood Ratio Inequalities for Unchosen Options: given  ∈  and  ∈ \,
Additional Behavioral Implications
We now discuss two additional behavioral implications of Shannon mutual information. In the next section we show that these, along with a few regularity conditions, are sufficient to characterize Shannon information cost.
Locally Invariant Posteriors
Our first experiment concerns how optimal attention strategies respond to changes in prior beliefs. A quick look at the conditions of Proposition 1 show that the only place that the priors enter is in the condition that
Hence if a set of options  and choice specific posteriors {  } ∈ form the basis for an optimal strategy for some decision problem ( ), then they also form the basis for an optimal strategy for any decision problem ( ) from which it is feasible to use these posteriors -that is for every prior belief that is in the convex hull of the posterior beliefs {  } ∈ . 
Proposition 4 has important implications for solving rational inattention models: the solution to one decision problem identifies a solution to many related problems. It also has comparative static implications for how the unconditional probability of choosing a given option must change with local changes in the prior belief. With posterior beliefs unchanged, the unconditional probabilities of choosing each option must change mechanically in order to ensure that rational expectations holds. Thus, once posterior beliefs have been observed, the response of the unconditional choice probabilities to local changes in the prior can be calculated from P       =   without recourse to any further details of the model.
Additivity of Orthogonal Choice Problems
Consider two choice problems ( ) and ( ). Suppose that the partitions Ψ  and Ψ  are independent given the prior . Together Ψ  and Ψ  define a third partition Υ which is the product of Ψ  and Ψ  : Υ = Ψ  × Ψ   Each event in Υ corresponds to the joint occurrence of an event in  ∈ Ψ  and an event in  ∈ Ψ  which we may denote . Suppose that Ψ  and Ψ  are independent in the sense that the probability of the joint event  is the product of the probabilities of the individual events  and . This induces a measure  on Υ. We say that ( ) and ( ) are orthogonal if Ψ  and Ψ  are independent.
Given two orthogonal choice problems we can construct a third choice problem in which the agent chooses simultaniously a set of options ( ) with  ∈  and  ∈  and the payoff to this choice is    +    . Let  denote the set of simultaneous choices. If   is the unconditional probability of choosing  ∈  in the problem ( ) and   is the probability of choosing  ∈  in the ( ) problem, then it turns out that     is the probability of choosing the combination ( ) in the ( ). Moreover, if    is the posterior probability of event  after choice  in the ( ) problem and    is the posterior probability of event  after choice  in the ( ), then       is the posterior probability of the joint event  after choice ( ) in the ( ) problem. We have the following proposition. 2 Proposition 5 (Independence of Orthogonal Decision Problems) Given two orthogonal choice problems ( ) and ( ) and the associated simultaneous problem ( ). If   is the unconditional probability of choosing option  ∈  and   is the associated posterior (given    0) and   is the unconditional probability of choosing option  ∈  with associated posterior   , then the unconditional probability of choosing option ( ) ∈  is  () =     and the associated posterior is     .
An immediate implication of this property is that is that
That the probability of choosing an option in the  problem is the sum over the probabilities of choosing that option in the  problem.
Sufficiency
The starting point for our analysis is Caplin and Dean (2013) . Suppose that we observe choices from all priors  ∈ ∆(Ω) and all subsets  ⊆ A. Caplin and Dean (2013) who show that if this data satisfies two conditions then it is as if the decision maker is maximizing expected utility subject to an information acquisition cost. The "no improving action switch" (NIAS) condition ensures that choices are optimal given what was learned about the state of the world. The "no improving attention cycles"(NIAC) condition ensures that total utility cannot be raised by reassigning attentional strategies across decision problems.
Given these conditions the decision problem ( ) may be represented by the maximization problem
for some function (  ) where  = {  } ∈ and  = {   } ∈∈Ω . Caplin and Dean show that it is without loss of generality to assume that  is nondecreasing in ( ) that are more informative in the sense of Blackwell.
Next we show that the three properties LIP, III and IODP define  as Shannon mutual information.
LIP implies posterior separability
Consider a class of cost functions (  ). The following proposition states that LIP implies separability across  and the   .
If LIP holds then local variation in  affects only the unconditional choice probabilities   and not the posterior beliefs   . The trade-off between posterior believes across states must be in some sense independent of the choice probabilities and the prior. Additive separability between the prior and the posterior ensures that the only way that the prior can affect the problem is through the rational expectations constraint. Additivity across the posteriors implies that the problem is linear in the choice probabilities.
If we assume that the learning cost is symmetric across options then we may take   = . Since  does not affect choice we may take  =  as well. The information cost function becomes
III implies additive separability across states
With III shifts in the prior across states have no effect on the optimal policy. By Bayes rule,    =        . Hence shifts in the prior across such states have a direct effect on the posterior in such states but no effect on the posteriors elsewhere.  must be additively separable across states if posteriors in some states are to be insulated from posteriors in others. We have the following proposition.
and that in addition III holds, then () = P    (  ).
If, in addition, we require that the information costs are symmetry across states we have   = , and
IODP implies Shannon
The final step in our construction is to show that IODP implies that () =  ln . The key step here is to show that IODP implies that the cost of learning about the joint events (     ) in the joint problem is equal to the sum of the cost of learning about the events   and   in their separate problems. This implies X
his already gets close to Shannon in that if   and   are uniform with  states in the  problem and  states in the  problem. This implies that
which is Cauchy's functional equation and for which the only well behaved solution is () =  ln() +  for some constants  and , and ln() is entropy of a uniform density.
and that IODP holds, then () =  ln .
Relationship to other axiomatizations
Our axiomatization is most closely related to de Oliveira. Our IODP is closely related to his "separability in orthogonal decisions." de Oliveira considers situations in which an agent must gather information and then make a decision from a randomly selected choice set. This allows him to separate information gathering from choice. Suppose that there are two choice problems  and  that share the partition Ψ  and two other choice problems  and  that share the partition Ψ  . Suppose that Ψ  and Ψ  are independent given . de Oliveira's axiom requires that if a lottery over  and  is preferred to a lottery over  and , then a lottery over  and  must be preferred to a lottery of  and . The idea is while  and  may provide different incentives for gathering information about Ψ  , no information about Ψ  can affect a decision over options with payoffs in Ψ  . This independence plays a big role in IODP as well.
de Oliveira's other main axiom, "independence of irrelevant flexibility", states that given a choice problem  the ability to condition choice on the occurrence of an event orthogonal to Ψ  has no value. This axiom is has some similarity to III. In both irrelevant information has no effect. They are not exactly the same however, since III refers to the rearrangement of probability within a single event in the partition, whereas independence of irrelevant flexibility refers to conditioning of all options on the occurrence of an orthogonal event.
There is no counterpart to LIP in de Oliveira.
Relation to other cost functions
Llosa and Venkateswaran (2013), Colombo, Femminis, and Pavan (2014) consider problems with quadratic payoffs and normal signals in which there is a convex cost to learning the precision of the signals. These papers include entropy costs as a special case when information costs are related to the logarithm of the precision. Other cases must violate one of our axioms. In this case it is IODP that does not hold.
To see this consider two choice problems. In both the prior over the state is normally distributed. It is easy to show that in such problems the posterior will be normally distributed. If the two problems are independent, the entropy of the posterior will be
where  2 1 is the posterior variance of the first state and  2 2 is the posterior variance of the second. We see that in this case the information cost is additively separable between the two states. Now if information costs are more concave than log:
In this case, it is more costly to learn about the two states together than it is to learn about them one at a time. If the information cost is less concave then log the opposite result holds: it becomes less costly to learn about the states together.
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2014) consider posterior separable information cost functions of the form (7) since these allow them to concavify their choice problem. Their cost function satisfies LIP, but does not impose III or IODP.
Woodford (2012) relaxes III. He relates an experiment by Shaw and Shaw. In the experiment, information is two dimensional. There is a variable  that can take a number of discrete values and the agent wishes to choose  = .  may appear at a number of locations indexed by . The location itself is not payoff relevant, hence III implies that in the Shannon model the statedependent choices   () will not depend on . In the experiment, however,  tended to track  more closely in locations  where  appeared more frequently.
Woodford proposes a cost function that penalizes learning in unlikely states by relating the cost of learning to the potential cost of information revelation.
Conclusion
We provide two new characterizations of the necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal choice with Shannon mutual information costs. We present a number of behavioral implications of the Shannon model such as the "invariant likelihood ratio" (ILR), "locally invariant posteriors" (LIP), the "irrelevance of irrelevant information" (III), and "independence of orthogonal decision problems" (IODP). We show that the latter three characterize the Shannon model.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 2: Irrelevance of Irrelevant Information
Consider the necessary and sufficient conditions for the problem ( )
Given an arbitrary  ∈ Ψ  and  1 and  2 such that  1 ∪ 2 =  and  1 ∩ 2 = ∅ changes in   1 and   2 that leave   fixed have no effect on (4) and hence no effect on the optimal policy.¥
Proof of Proposition 5: Independence of Orthogonal Decision Problems
It is useful to break up the necessary and sufficient conditions (4) for the problem ( ):
Here    is a placeholder standing in for the denominator of (4). Similar conditions can be written for the ( ) and ( ) problems. We show that if (     ) and (     ) satisfy these conditions then so do (
Note first that  () is weakly positive since   and   are weakly positive and
so  () is a probability vector.
Consider the first set of conditions
The first equality follows from the proposed form of   and the fact that 
The inequality follows from the fact that (     ) and (     ) each separately satisfy the first set of conditions. [Note that complementary slackness implies that an act ( ) in the  problem will only be chosen if both acts  and  are chosen in their respective problems.] Now consider the second condition. We know that (     ) and (     ) solve their respective problems. Hence Ã X
invoking the proposed forms for   and   , the definition of    and the independence of the events in Ψ  and Ψ  
Proof of Proposition 6: LIP implies posterior separability (Sketch) (Note: proof assumes differentiability) Consider an arbitrary (  ) such that P       =   . Consider a choice problem ( ) such that ( ) is the optimal policy. (Note: might need a concavity assumption on  to ensure that all choices are possible; might be sufficient to characterize  on all potential outcomes; Caplin and Dean argue that without loss of generality  more information in Blackwell sense is more costly which should imply concavity).
Consider the problem
such that P       =   (rational expectations) and P     = 1 (adding up). Let   denote the multiplier on the RE constraint.
   =   − (  )   So long as  is in the cone defined by, is fixed and
so that     =    is constant and independent of . Let
Moreover, from the first order condition for  
It follows that the   are constant.
Now look at FOC for 
Compare across two states to eliminate  
The left hand side is constant so the right hand side must be independent of  and  for all chosen in equilibrium. It follows that
Need symmetry to get   = . As () is independent of choice, we may take it to be  as well.¥
Proof of Proposition 7: III implies separability across states (Sketch)
